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TEXAS

Don Hueske & Garrett Korbitz*
I. Introduction
The following is an update on Texas legislative activity and case law
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2018 to July 31, 2019.

* Don Hueske is a Member in The Woodlands office of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC and
has been Board Certified in Oil, Gas and Mineral Law by the Texas Board of Legal
Specialization. He can be reached at don.hueske@steptoe-johnson.com. Garrett L. Korbitz, an
Associate in The Woodlands office of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, focuses his practice in the
area of energy law and mineral title law, and is licensed to practice in Texas.
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II. Judicial Developments
A. Accommodation Doctrine
1. VirTex Operating Co. v. Bauerle, No. 04-16-00549-CV, 2017 WL
5162546, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 8, 2017) rev. denied
(Mar. 29, 2019), reh’g filed (May 15, 2019) (mem. op.).
Robert Leon Bauerle and Cynthia Bauerle (“the Bauerles”) own and
operate an 8,500-acre ranch, which they regularly lease to hunters.1 The
hunters utilize helicopters on the land, often flying between 4-5 feet above
the ground to capture deer.2
VirTex Operating Co., Inc. and VirTex Producing Company, L.P.
(“VirTex”) own and operate nine wells on the property.3 VirTex proposed an
easement to the Baurles in order to replace the generators with overhead
powerlines to run the pumpjacks associated with the wells.4 The Bauerles
refused this proposal and asked VirTex to halt construction of the powerlines.
VirTex obliged.5 The trial court found in favor of the Baurles, finding that
VirTex’s proposal to install the overhead powerlines violated the
accommodation doctrine and that VirTex breached the surface use agreement
that they had with the Baurles.6
On appeal, VirTex argued that the Bauerles failed to prove the elements
of the accommodation doctrine.7 First, VirTex claimed that the Baurles failed
to prove that the proposed powerlines would completely or substantially
impair existing hunting operations on the land.8 The court rejected this
argument, finding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude
that the powerlines would significantly limit the Bauerles’s and their lessee’s
use of the land for hunting activities.9 The evidence demonstrated that flying
helicopters on the property with the presence of these powerlines would

1. VirTex Operating Co. v. Bauerle, No. 04-16-00549-CV, 2017 WL 5162546, at *1
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 8, 2017), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 2019), reh’g filed (May 15,
2019) (mem. op.).
2. Id.
3. Id. at *2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *7.
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constitute “a very dangerous situation,” with some pilots even saying that
they would no longer conduct the flights if the powerlines were to stay.10
VirTex next argued that the Baurles did not prove that there was not a
reasonable alternative to these helicopter operations.11 The court again
rejected this argument. VirTex argued that there were reasonable
alternatives, such as four wheelers, which could be used where the proposed
powerlines would be placed.12 Further, this would allow the use of
helicopters on the other 5,500 acres where there would be no powerlines. 13
The Baurles countered, claiming that due to the unpredictable nature of the
deer and the amount of ground the hunters must cover, helicopters are the
only reasonable means of conducting the captures.14 Two of the hunters who
lease the property from the Baurles supported their counter argument and
claimed that they would no longer lease the property if they were unable to
conduct the deer captures via helicopter.15
Lastly, VirTex argued that the Baurles had not shown that there was a
reasonable, customary and industry-accepted alternative available to
VirTex.16 However, the court found the Bauerle’s proposals had satisfied this
element.17 The Baurles proposed a number of reasonable alternatives to the
overhead powerlines such as: continuing running the pumpjacks with the
generators, underground powerlines, or running the pumpjacks with diesel or
natural gas.18 Evidence showed that running the pumpjacks by natural gas or
by underground powerlines were reasonable alternatives, despite resulting in
additional costs to VirTex.19 An owner and officer of VirTex also testified
that they could continue powering the pumpjacks with the generators and that
they were using this more expensive method elsewhere.20 The court did not
find that the additional hardships or costs that these alternatives posed made
them unreasonable.21

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *10.
Id.
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and the supreme
court has denied VirTex’s petition to hear the case.22
B. Force Majeure Events
1. TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018) rev. denied, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 834
(Tex. Aug. 30, 2019).
TEC Olmos, LLC (“Olmos”) entered into a farmout agreement
(“agreement”) with ConocoPhillips Company (“ConocoPhillips”) to testdrill land that ConocoPhillips had leased.23 The parties agreed to a specific
date by which drilling had to be completed, a $500,000 liquidated damages
provision if Olmos did not meet this deadline, and a force majeure provision
that outlined different occurrences which would toll the drilling deadline.24
These occurrences included “fire, flood, storm, act of God, governmental
authority, labor disputes, war or any other cause not enumerated herein but
which is beyond the reasonable control of the Party whose performance is
affected. . . .”25
The price of oil dropped significantly after the parties entered into the
agreement causing Olmos to lose its financing for the project. Unable to
secure other financing, Olmos failed to meet the drilling deadline. Olmos
invoked the force majeure provision claiming that the sudden drop in oil
prices was a covered occurrence. ConocoPhillips sought a declaration that
the drop in oil prices was not a covered occurrence and that they were entitled
to the $500,000 liquidated damages. The trial court granted ConocoPhillips’
motion for summary judgment.26
Olmos appealed, arguing that fact issues precluded summary judgment on
their invocation of the force majeure clause and regarding whether the
liquidated damages provision was an unenforceable penalty.27
Olmos first argued that the downturn in oil prices was a covered force
majeure event because the catch-all provision covered “any other cause not
enumerated herein but which is beyond the reasonable control of the Party

22. Id. at *13.
23. TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2018) rev. denied, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 834 (Tex. Aug. 30, 2019).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 180.
27. Id.
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whose performance is affected.”28 The court stated that, because the
provision did not explicitly enumerate a drop in oil prices as a covered
occurrence, the real issue is whether the catch-all provision includes events
that are foreseeable.29 The court held that a market downturn is a foreseeable
event and is therefore not a covered force majeure occurrence.30
The court also used the canon of construction, ejusdem generis, to come
to this conclusion.31 This principle states that “the latter must be limited to
things like the former.”32 The court found that the former in this case, “fire,
flood, storm, act of God, governmental authority, labor disputes, [and] war,”
were not like the latter, a sudden drop in oil prices.33 The former constituted
natural or man-made disasters which are foreseeable but happen so rarely
that planning for them and allocating risks based on them is not practical.34
The latter, on the other hand, occur fairly frequently and can be insured
against through means other than a force majeure provision.35
Olmos next claimed that the trial court erred in awarding ConocoPhillips
the $500,000 liquidated damages because such damages constituted an
unenforceable penalty.36 However, the court in Phillips v. Phillips found that
these contractual damages provisions are enforceable if it is impossible or
very difficult to estimate the amount of damages and the amount of damages
is reasonable under the circumstances.37 Olmos asserted that the second
element was not satisfied because the amount of damages provided for at the
time of the agreement was not necessarily reflective of the estimated amount
of damages at the time of the breach.38 The court, finding this was not the
test, stated that the test looks to whether the provision is a reasonable estimate
of the damages at the time of the agreement, not at the time of the breach. 39
The court found that the damages provided for at the time the parties entered
into the agreement were reasonable under the circumstances.40
28. Id. 181-182 (citing Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Co., 743 S.W.2d 658,
660 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1987)).
29. Id. at 182 (referencing Valero Transmission Co., 743 S.W. 2d 658).
30. Id. at 183.
31. Id. at 185.
32. Id. (citing, e.g., Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 504 (Tex. 2015).
33. Id. at 186.
34. Id. at 184.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 187.
37. .Id. (citing Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. 1991).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 188.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

286

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 5

Therefore, the court denied both of Olmos’ arguments and affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. Olmos has petitioned the Texas Supreme Court to
review the court of appeals decision.41
C. Executive Duties
1. Texas Outfitters Limited, LLC v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647 (Tex.
2019).
In 2002, Texas Outfitters Limited, LLC (“Texas Outfitters”) offered to
buy the 1,082-acre Derby Ranch (the “Ranch”) surface estate.42 The Carters
owned 50% of the mineral interest and the Hindeses owned the other 50%.43
In 2002, Texas Outfitters purchased from Dora Jo Carter the Carters’ surface
estate, the executive rights to the Carters 50% mineral interest, and a 4.16%
royalty interest.44 Texas Outfitters was later approached with two lease offers
which were rejected in order to protect Texas Outfitters’ hunting business.
The first offer was made in March 2010 and was for a 22% royalty and a
$450 per acre bonus.45 The second offer was made in June 2010 and was for
a 25% royalty and a $1,750 per acre bonus.46 The Hindeses received the
second offer to lease their 50% mineral interest which they accepted.47 The
Carters, wanting Texas Outfitters to lease their mineral interest, eventually
sued Texas Outfitters after a year of negotiating a settlement of this issue.
The Carters claimed that Texas Outfitters failure to lease was a breach of its
duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing.48 Texas Outfitters continued to
receive offers to lease the Carters’ mineral interest but opted to sell the
surface and executive rights to a third party.49
The trial court found in favor of the Carters and awarded them
$867,654.32 in damages.50 The court of appeals affirmed, and the supreme
court granted Texas Outfitters’ petition to hear their appeal.51
The supreme court, noted said that determining whether an executive
breached its duty to a non-executive turned on “whether the executive
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 185.
Texas Outfitters Ltd. v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 649 (Tex. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 649-50.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 649-50.
Id. at 650
Id. at 650-51.
Id. at 651-52.
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engaged in acts of self-dealing that unfairly diminished the value of the nonexecutive interest.”52 The court relied on the following principal findings
from the trial court in coming to their conclusion:
[B]y refusing the El Paso lease, Texas Outfitters “chose to
gamble” with both its own mineral interest and the Carters' much
larger interest knowing that the Carters did not want to take that
gamble; Texas Outfitters refused the El Paso lease knowing the
Hindeses had already leased their 50% interest to El Paso, thereby
diminishing the potential pool of lessees; and refusing the lease
allowed Texas Outfitters to retain unfettered use of the surface to
operate its planned hunting operations and to sell the ranch at a
profit free of any encumbrances.53
The court, recognizing the difficulty in determining whether an executive has
breached its duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing, affirmed the lower
courts’ rulings finding that there was legally sufficient evidence to support
the claim that Texas Outfitters had breached their duty to the Carters. 54 The
court focused on the evidence presented that showed it was common for other
owners in the area who ran commercial hunting operations to lease the
minerals to operators who accommodated the surface use.55 The court
concluded that this evidence sufficiently supported the trial court’s
conclusion that Texas Outfitters’ self-dealing unfairly diminished the value
of the Carters’ non-executive interest.56
D. Post Production Costs
1. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. LP v. Texas Crude Energy, LLC, 573
S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2019), reh'g denied by 2019 Tex. LEXIS 549 (Tex.
May 31, 2019).
In 2005 Texas Crude Energy, LLC (“Texas Crude”) and Burlington
Resources Oil & Gas L.P. (“Burlington”) entered into a Prospect
Development Agreement (“PDA”) and Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”)
for oil and gas leases in Live Oak, Karnes and Bee Counties.57 Under these
agreements, Burlington, the operator, would receive an 87.5% working
52. Id. at 649 (quoting KCM Fin., LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex. 2015).
53. Id. at 654.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 656.
56. Id. at 657-58.
57. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. Texas Crude Energy, LLC, 573 S.W.3d 198, 201
(Tex. 2019), reh’g denied, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 549 (Tex. May 31, 2019).
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interest in the leases and Texas Crude would receive a 12.5% working
interest.58 In addition, Texas Crude would receive an overriding royalty
interest of 0% to 6.25% on leases taken within the Area of Mutual Interest
(“AMI”).59
The assignments of the overriding royalties contained granting and
valuation clauses which contained similar language.60 The Granting Clause
provided:
[Assignor] does hereby ASSIGN, TRANSFER AND CONVEY
unto [Assignee], its successors and assigns, those certain
overriding royalty interests, as set out below, in the quantity
described below in all oil, gas, condensate, drip gasoline and other
hydrocarbons that may be produced and saved from those lands
covered by those certain oil, gas and mineral leases described in
Exhibit “A” attached hereto and made a part hereof for all
purposes, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of the said oil,
gas and mineral leases. Said overriding royalty interests shall be
delivered to ASSIGNEE into the pipelines, tanks or other
receptacles with which the wells may be connected, free and clear
of all development, operating, production and other
costs. However, ASSIGNEE shall in every case bear and pay all
windfall profits, production and severance taxes assessed against
such overriding royalty interest.61
The Valuation Clause provided that the assignment “shall be subject to the
following terms and conditions”:
The overriding royalty interest share of production shall be
delivered to ASSIGNEE or to its credit into the pipeline, tank or
other receptacle to which any well or wells on such lands may be
connected, free and clear of all royalties and all other burdens and
all costs and expenses except the taxes thereon or attributable
thereto, or ASSIGNOR, at ASSIGNEE's election, shall pay to
ASSIGNEE, for ASSIGNEE's overriding royalty oil, gas or other
minerals, the applicable percentage of the value of the oil, gas or
other minerals, as applicable, produced and saved under the
leases. “Value”, as used in this Assignment, shall refer to (i) in the
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis original).
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event of an arm's length sale on the leases, the amount realized
from such sale of such production and any products thereof, (ii) in
the event of an arm's length sale off of the leases, the amount
realized for the sale of such production and any products thereof,
and (iii) in all other cases, the market value at the wells.62
Texas Crude accepted royalty payments for nine years which reflected the
deduction of post-production costs. The two parties began to have
disagreements and Texas Crude eventually sued Burlington claiming that the
Valuation Clause entitled them to royalties free of post-production costs.
Burlington countered, arguing that the Granting Clause, Valuation Clause,
PDA, and JOA, when read together, permitted them to deduct Texas Crude’s
share of post-production costs.63
The trial court, finding that Texas Crude was entitled to its royalty free of
post-production costs, granted its motion for partial summary judgment. The
trial court, however, authorized an interlocutory appeal which the court of
appeals accepted. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment
and Burlington appealed to the supreme court.64
The supreme court stated that the dispositive issue in the case is whether
the parties agreed to an “at the well” valuation entitling Burlington the right
to deduct post-production costs from the royalty it paid to Texas Crude.65 In
order to make this determination the court reviewed the Granting Clause,
Valuation Clause, and JOA.66 The court first looked to the Granting and
Valuation Clauses.67 On the one hand, the clauses contained “into the
pipeline” language which would suggest an “at the well” valuation entitling
Burlington to deduct post-production costs from its royalty payments.68 On
the other hand, the Valuation Clause contained “amount realized” language
which suggests that post-productions costs should not have been deducted.69
Burlington then pulled language from the JOA to support its interpretation.70
Burlington cited the following provision claiming it was consistent with their
interpretation of an “at the wellhead” pricing point:

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. (emphasis original)
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 204-05.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 208.
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Each party shall have the right but not the obligation to take in
kind or separately dispose of its proportionate share of the oil and
gas produced from the Contract Area .... In the event any party
shall fail to make the arrangements necessary to take in kind or
separately dispose of its proportionate share of the oil and/or gas
produced from the Contract Area, Operator shall have the right,
subject to the revocation at will by the party owning it, but not the
obligation, to purchase such oil and/or gas or sell it to others at
any time and from time to time, and shall account to such party
for the actual net proceeds received for such production if sold to
a non-affiliated third party in an arm's length transaction, or the
current market price if purchased by Operator or an affiliate of
Operator.71
The court found this persuasive as it had interpreted similar “net proceeds”
language to authorize deduction of post-production costs before.72 The
supreme court reversed the court of appeals stating that, in the context of all
the agreements between the two, the “amount realized” language was in
reference to the wellhead or nearby giving Burlington the right to deduct
post-production costs from Texas Crude’s royalty payments.73
E. Offset Requirements and Compensatory Damages
1. Bell v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 04-18-00129-CV, 2019 WL
1139584 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2019) pet. for rev. filed
(Jun. 27, 2019).
This case came to the court of appeals by way of a permissive accelerated
appeal.74 At the trial court level, the trial court found for Bell who sought
Compensatory Royalties for the horizontal wells drilled on adjacent lease
tracts, with at least portions of the wellbore within 330 feet of Bell’s lease.75
The court agreed to hear two questions surrounding the Bell and Ward
leases.76 The issues presented to the court involve lease interpretation of the

71. Id. (emphasis original).
72. Id. at 209 (citing Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., 939 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. 1996)).
73. Id. at 212.
74. Bell v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 04-18-2019-CV, 2019 WL 1139584, *1 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2019).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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similar, yet different, Bell and Ward leases.77 Both leases include language
that reads:
ROYALTY – OIL GROSS PROCEEDS DEFINITION. “Gross
Proceeds” as used herein shall mean the total proceeds received
by Lessee for any sale of Oil or condensate; ....
ROYALTY – GAS GROSS PROCEEDS DEFINITION. “Gross
Proceeds” as used herein shall mean the total proceeds received
by Lessee for any sale of such Gas; ....
HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL WELLS. A “Horizontal Well”
shall mean a well where it is necessary to cut a window for the
purpose of drilling horizontally a distance of over thirty (30) feet
from the vertical well bore and for which the TRC or the
appropriate state agency requires directional or inclination
surveys to be filed and a “Vertical Well” shall mean a well having
a vertical drain hole which shall not be deviated from the vertical
except randomly to straighten a hole which has become crooked
in the normal course of Drilling, or to sidetrack a portion of a hole
because of mechanical difficulty in Drilling.78
The following language is only contained within the Bell lease:
18. OFFSET REQUIREMENT AND COMPENSATORY
ROYALTY. In the event a well (“Adjacent Well”) producing Oil
or Gas in Paying Quantities is drilled and completed after the date
of this Lease on land under which Lessor does not own the
quantity of minerals or royalty as under the lands covered by this
Lease, and such Adjacent Well is draining the Leased Premises or
is deemed draining if the Adjacent Well is located within three
hundred thirty (330) feet of the Leased Premises, or, when Lessee
has an economic interest in said Adjacent Well and said Adjacent
Well is located within four hundred sixty seven (467) feet of the
Leased Premises (in the case of a Vertical Well, distance will be
measured from the surface location or bottom hole location of the
Adjacent Well, whichever is closer; in the case of a Horizontal
Well distance will be measured from the surface location or the
subsurface path of a horizontal drainbore, from its point of entry
into the productive horizon to its terminus, whichever is closer),
77. Id.
78. Id.
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then Lessee agrees to drill such offset wells which is [sic]
reasonably designed to protect the Leased Premises from
drainage, or at the option of Lessee, shall pay to Lessor the
Compensatory Royalties set forth below, or execute and deliver to
Lessor a release in recordable form releasing acreage in an amount
equivalent to the number of acres required or permitted by the
Texas Railroad Commission to drill an offset well to the formation
of such Adjacent Well. Lessee shall have ninety (90) days from
the date of first production of such Adjacent Well within which to
Commence Actual Drilling Operations of an offset well or release
offsetting acreage, and thereafter, Lessee's sole obligation shall be
to pay Compensatory Royalties as set forth herein....79
Finally, the following language is only found in the Ward lease:
17. DUTY TO EXPLORE DEVELOP AND PROTECT. Lessee
also hereby expressly covenants and agrees to diligently and fully
explore, develop, and protect the Leased Premises as a reasonably
prudent operator.
18. OFFSET REQUIREMENT AND COMPENSATORY
ROYALTY. In the event a well (“Adjacent Well”) producing Oil
or Gas in Paying Quantities is drilled and completed after the date
of this Lease on land under which Lessor does not own the
quantity of minerals or royalty as under the lands covered by this
Lease, and such Adjacent Well is draining the Leased Premises or
is deemed draining if the Adjacent Well is located within the
spacing distance as set in the current field rules as promulgated by
the Railroad Commission of Texas but must do so if the adjacent
well is within four hundred sixty-seven (467) feet of the Leased
Premises, distance will be measured from the surface location or
bottom hole location of the Adjacent Well, whichever is closer; in
the case of a Horizontal Well distance will be measured from the
surface location or the subsurface path of a horizontal drainbore,
from its point of entry into the productive horizon to its terminus,
whichever is closer), then Lessee shall within one hundred eighty
(180) days after commencement of production from such
Adjacent Well, Commence the Actual Drilling Operations for the
Drilling of an offset well on the Leased Premises and diligently
pursue such Operations to the horizon in which such Adjacent
79. Id.
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Well is producing, or at the option of Lessee, shall pay to Lessor
the Compensatory Royalties set forth below, or execute and
deliver to Lessor a release in recordable form surrendering
acreage in an amount equivalent to the Well Tract of the Adjacent
Well....80
The first question presented to the court, which is the crux of Bell’s appeal,
is whether “the formula for calculating the Compensatory Royalty based on
take points of the Adjacent Well within the triggering distance(s)” is
contained in the unambiguous provisions of the Leases.81 The second
question presented, which is the focus of Chesapeake’s cross-appeal, is
whether “the reasonably prudent operator standard appl[ies]… to the lessee’s
offset obligations” under the unambiguous terms of the leases.82
The court determined that both questions depended on the construction of
Paragraph 18 of the leases.83 In examining Paragraph 18 of each lease, the
court found that Chesapeake had three available courses of action once an
adjacent well began producing: “(1) drill an offset well; (2) release sufficient
acreage; or (3) pay the Compensatory Royalty.”84
With these three options in mind, the court turned to question number two
(noting that Chesapeake’s liability claim logically precedes Bell’s
compensation claim).85 Chesapeake claimed that this standard was expressly
included in the lease and provided numerous cases for support. The court
found that Chesapeake’s supporting cases claiming that this standard was
expressly included in the lease were inapplicable and noted that nothing in
Paragraph 18 of either lease that would suggest Chesapeake was to be held
to the standard of a reasonably prudent operator standard, denied
Chesapeake’s claim and turned to Bell’s compensation claim.86
The court first looked to the lease, which defined Compensatory Royalty
as “an amount equal to the Royalty Share of Gross Proceeds of production
from the Adjacent Well.”87 Further, Gross Proceeds was defined as “the total
proceeds received by Lessee for any sale of [Oil or condensate/ Gas].”88
Finding that the issue turned on what “total proceeds” meant, the court turned
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at *2
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5-6.
Id. *6-12.
Id. at *12.
Id.
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to the lease language to determine if total proceeds meant “production from
the entirety of a horizontal well, any part of which falls within the Trigger
Distances, or production attributable only to those perforations (take points)
that are within those Trigger Distances.”89 The court started with the
definition of Compensatory Royalty, particularly the words “Adjacent
Well.”90 The court found that the parties expressly stated how to determine
if a horizontal well was within the Trigger Distances set out in the lease (“in
the case of a Horizontal Well distance will be measured from the surface
location or the subsurface path of a horizontal drainbore, from its point of
entry into the productive horizon to its terminus, whichever is closer.”).91
Finding significance in this, the court concluded that Chesapeake’s
Paragraph 18 obligations were triggered if the surface location of the
horizontal well is within the Trigger Distances regardless of where the well
went from there.92 Chesapeake argued that the nature of horizontal wells and
case law supported their argument that Compensatory Royalties should be
measured based on the take points. However, the court found that a plain
reading of the lease did not support this.93 The court noted that the cases were,
again, distinguishable and if Chesapeake wanted the Compensatory
Royalties to be calculated based on the take points, they should have said so
in the lease.94 Therefore, the court found that the Compensatory Royalties
due to Bell were to be calculated based on the entirety of the horizontal well
which surface location was within the Trigger Distances specified in the
lease.95
F. Continuous Development Provisions
1. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 563 S.W.3d 449
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2018) pet. for rev. filed (Mar. 13, 2019).
Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. (“Endeavor”) was the successor in
interest to a lease originally entered into between John Thomas Quinn
(“Quinn”), lessor, and OGX Resources, LLC, lessee.96 The lease had a threeyear primary term and a continuous development provision, which is the
89. Id.
90. Id. at *13.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *13.
94. Id. at *13-15.
95. Id. at *16.
96. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 563 S.W.3d 449, 451 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2018).
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source of the conflict in this case.97 The provision read, in relevant part, as
follows: “Lessee shall have the right to accumulate unused days in any 150day term during the continuous development program in order to extend the
next allowed 150-day term between the completion of one well and the
drilling of a subsequent well.”98 Endeavor, which did not begin drilling until
145 days after the primary term had expired, drilled 12 wells over the next
five years.99 After the twelfth well was completed, Endeavor did not begin
drilling the thirteenth within the next 300 days.100 On the 311th day after the
completion of the twelfth well, Quinn signed a new lease with Energen which
quickly filed an action against Endeavor claiming that the continuous
development provision in Endeavor’s lease had lapsed.101 Endeavor claimed
that they had accumulated 227 additional days under the provision because
they had the right to accumulate, for use on subsequent wells, the number of
days that it drilled sooner than 150 days for each of the first twelve wells.102
Energen, however, claimed that the accumulated days could only be used to
extend that deadline for the next well drilled.103 The trial court, agreeing with
Energen’s interpretation of the provision, granted Energen’s motion for
summary judgment and denied Endeavor’s.104 Endeavor appealed, claiming
that the plain language of the provision allowed them flexibility in
accumulating unused days.105
The court of appeals disagreed with Endeavor’s interpretation and
affirmed the trial court’s decision.106 The court’s analysis focused on a couple
points. First, they pointed out that the provision stated that the accumulated
days could be used on the next allowed 150-day term.107 The court, looking
to the dictionary for support, found this to mean that the accumulation of days
from the early drilling on one well could only be used to extend the drilling
of the next, or immediately following, well, not other wells drilled in the
future.108 Second, Endeavor claimed that terminating the portions of the lease
not yet developed would be contrary to the point of oil and gas leases, which
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 451-52.
Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 455.
Id.
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is the development of minerals.109 They claimed that the inclusion of the
continuous development provision was so that the entire leasehold estate
would be developed.110 The court agreed with Endeavor that this was the
purpose of an oil and gas lease.111 However, this was one of the very reasons
they agreed with Energen’s interpretation. The court, pointing out that
Endeavor’s interpretation allowed Endeavor to cease development
operations for over a year, found that Endeavor’s interpretation conflicted
with the very purpose of the continuous development provision.112 For these
reasons, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Endeavor
has since petitioned the supreme court for appeal.113
G. Correction Instruments
1. Yates Energy Corp. v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, No. 04-17-00310-CV,
2018 WL 6626605 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 19, 2018) pet. for rev.
filed (Jun. 27, 2019) (memo op.)
Mary Frances Evers (“Mary”) created an intervivos trust, containing
mineral interests, which was amended several times throughout her life.114
The most recent amendment was executed in February 2003 and provided
that Broadway Bank, the trustee, was to allocate the property upon her death
to her descendants, per stirpes.115 After Mary’s death, Broadway Bank
distributed 25% shares to each of four living descendants in fee simple via a
2005 Mineral Deed, including John Evers.116 According to the 2003 Trust
Amendment, John Evers was only to receive a life estate in the minerals and
therefore Broadway Bank executed a 2006 Correction Mineral Deed to John
for a life estate in the minerals.117 John did not sign the correction deed. In
2012, John conveyed his interest in the minerals via a Royalty Deed to Yates
Energy Corporation.118 Yates Energy Corporation, in compliance with a
farmout agreement with EOG Resources, conveyed 70% of its rights in the
109. Id. at 456.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 457.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Yates Energy Corp. v. Broadway Nat’l Bank, No. 04-17-00310-CV, 2018 WL
6626605, *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 19, 2018), pet. for rev. filed (Jun. 27, 2019)
(memo op.).
115. Id.
116. Id. at *1-2.
117. Id. at *2.
118. Id.
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minerals to EOG Resources.119 Yates ultimately assigned the rest of their
interest to numerous parties.120
In 2013, a title examiner informed EOG Resources that there may be some
issue with the 2006 Correction Mineral Deed, namely the fact that John’s
signature was missing from the document.121Further, the 2003 Trust
Amendment could be read as giving Broadway Bank the right to convey only
a life estate in the subject land and therefore the 2005 Mineral Deed could
have only conveyed to John a life estate in the minerals.122 Attempting to cure
these errors, Broadway Bank executed an Amended Correction Deed in 2013
including John and all the original grantees.123 However, it did not include
Yates Energy Corporation or any of the assignees of Yates’ interest.124 After
John died in 2014, the parties disputed whether John had conveyed his
interest to the remaindermen of his life estate or if he had conveyed the
interests to Yates Energy Corporation and their assignees.125 The probate
court concluded that the 2013 Amended Correction Deed, which granted
John Evers a life estate, was valid.126 It also concluded that Yates Energy
Corporation had a life estate in the minerals and because John had died the
interests were now owned by John’s remaindermen.127
The crux of the appeal dealt with the argument that the 2013 Amended
Correction Deed was invalid because of the material corrections statute.128 It
is undisputed that a material correction was made under the statute, but the
issue was whether the right people executed the corrective instrument. The
statute first identifies who may execute a correction:
In addition to nonmaterial corrections, including the corrections
described by Section 5.028, the parties to the original transaction
or the parties' heirs, successors, or assigns, as applicable may
execute a correction instrument to make a material correction to
the recorded original instrument of conveyance. . . .129

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
TEX PROP. CODe § 5.029(a) (Lexis Advance through the 2019 Reg. Sess.)
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It then identifies who must execute a correction:
A correction instrument under this section must be:
(1) executed by each party to the recorded original instrument of
conveyance the correction instrument is executed to correct or, if
applicable, a party's heirs, successors, or assigns. . . . 130
The court focused on the words “or, if applicable” in coming to its
conclusion.131 Siding with Yates Energy Corporation, the court of appeals
held that:
a correction instrument making a material change must be
executed by a party’s heirs, successors, or assigns, as opposed to
the original parties of the recorded instrument, if the property
interest conveyed in the original instrument has been assigned or
conveyed by an original party to that party’s heirs, successors, or
assigns.132
In other words, John Evers received a full fee simple interest in the 2005
Mineral Deed and subsequently conveyed that interest to Yates Energy
Corporation in the 2012 Royalty Deed.133 By not including all the required
signatures on the corrective instruments of the 2005 Mineral Deed, the
corrective instruments were found to be ineffective.134
H. Estoppel by Deed
1. Trial v. Dragon, No. 18-0203, 2019 WL 2554130 (Tex. June 21,
2019).
Leo Trial and his six siblings each owned a 1/7 interest in a tract of land.135
In 1983, Leo gifted half of his interest to his wife, Ruth, leaving himself with
a 1/14 interest and his wife with a 1/14 interest.136 In 1992, Leo and his
siblings conveyed their interest to the Dragons reserving a fifteen-year
mineral interest.137 The Trials also generally warranted the conveyance. Ruth,
however was not a party to the Dragon conveyance and her interest was not
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

TEX PROP. CODE § 5.029(b) (Lexis Advance through the 2019 Reg. Sess.)
Yates Energy Corp., 2018 WL 6626605 at *6.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Trial v. Dragon, No. 18-0203, 2019 WL 2554130, *1 (Tex. 2019).
Id.
Id.
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mentioned in the conveyance.138 In 2010, Ruth died intestate, leaving each of
her two sons, Joseph and Michael, a 1/28 interest in the subject land.139 After
the fifteen-year mineral reservation expired, the Dragons became aware of
the 1/14 interest that Ruth and Leo’s two sons owned and filed suit for breach
of warranty and estoppel by deed.140 The trial court granted the Trials’ motion
for summary judgment, which the Dragons appealed.141 The court of appeals
reversed finding that because Leo breached the general warranty at the time
of conveyance to the Dragon’s, estoppel by deed forbids Leo, as well as his
“grantors, grantees, privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law” (his
sons) from claiming an interest in contradiction of the general warranty.142
The supreme court accepted the Trials’ petition for review.143
The supreme court first addressed the applicability of the Duhig rule and
estoppel by deed.144 The court, looking to the ruling in Duhig, concluded that
it only applied when the grantor (Leo) “owns the exact interest to remedy the
breach at the time of execution and equity otherwise demands it.”145 At the
time of execution, Leo did not own the interest that would remedy the
situation because he had already conveyed it to Ruth.146 Therefore, the Duhig
rule did not apply. The court pointed out, however, that if Leo had held the
interest in a trust for his two sons, the outcome may have been different.147
The court also found that estoppel by deed did not apply. Estoppel by deed
means that all parties to a deed are bound by the deed’s recitals, which
operate as an estoppel.148 However, Joseph and Michael were not parties to
the Dragon deed and they did not claim their interest arose through the
Dragon deed.149 Therefore, the court found that estoppel by deed also did not
apply based on these facts.150 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals
decision on the application of the Duhig rule and estoppel by deed.151 It did,
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
1940)).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5 (citing Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Tex.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *9.
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however, find that the neither the trial court nor the court of appeals
addressed the breach of warranty claim correctly.152 The court said that the
real issue, that had not been answered by either of the previous courts is:
whether the Trial sons are liable for damages when they fail to
warrant and defend against their own adverse claim to the
property—their claim deriving from the interest they inherited
from Ruth's separate property—and if so, what the amount of
those damages would be.153
Because both courts failed to address this question, the supreme court
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.154
I. Refusal of Consent to Assignment
1. Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 17-0332,
2019 WL 2668317 (Tex. June 28, 2019).
Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. (“Carrizo”) held a lease on 22,000 acres, which
was set to expire in April 2011. In order to maintain the lease, it entered into
a farmout agreement with Barrow-Shaver Resources Company (“BarrowShaver”) in March 2011.155 The agreement provided that if Barrow-Shaver
drilled a producing well, Carrizo would assign its interest in the 22,000-acre
lease to Barrow-Shaver.156 The consent to assign provision in the agreement
read: “[t]he rights provided to [Barrow-Shaver] under this Letter Agreement
may not be assigned, subleased or otherwise transferred in whole or in part,
without the express written consent of Carrizo.”157 Evidence demonstrated
that Barrow-Shaver wanted language in the provision that stated consent
would not be unreasonably withheld.158 However, after repeated oral
assurances from Carrizo that consent would not be unreasonably withheld,
Barrow-Shaver signed the agreement without this language included.159
Barrow-Shaver was ultimately unsuccessful in drilling the well, but was
approached by Raptor Petroleum II, LLC (“Raptor”) about assigning
Barrow-Shaver’s interest in the farmout agreement.160 Carrizo would not
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 17-0332, 2019 WL 2668317
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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consent and the deal with Raptor fell through. Barrow-Shaver sued Carrizo
claiming breach of contract, fraud, and tortious interference.161
The trial court found that, although the agreement was unambiguous, the
consent to assignment provision was silent as to the reasons for which
Carrizo could withhold its consent.162 Therefore, the court submitted the
issues to the jury which unanimously found in favor of Barrow-Shaver for
approximately $27 million. On appeal, the court reversed this decision
finding that, because the consent to assign provision was silent as to when
consent could be withheld, Carrizo could withhold consent for any reason.
The first issue addressed by the supreme court was whether Carrizo had
an unqualified right to withhold consent. Barrow-Shaver claimed that,
according to industry custom, consent could not be unreasonable or
arbitrarily withheld.163 The court first stated that the consent to assign
provision was unambiguous.164 However, the agreement was silent as to
when consent could be withheld.165 In cases such as this, the court can only
supplement or give further definition to silence as it relates to a material term
of the contract.166 The court here, noting that the purpose of a farmout
agreement is the farmee’s obligation to drill, found that a consent to assign
provision is not material to the farmout and therefore cannot be supplemented
or given further definition.167 The court also found that when an agreement
is sufficiently definite to understand each parties’ rights obligations, as they
are here, additional terms are not material.168
Barrow-Shaver next argued that the court should impose an implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing on Carrizo.169 The court, however, found that,
absent a special relationship, parties to an agreement have no duty to act in
good faith.170 Here, the court found that because both parties are sophisticated
in oil and gas matters, farmouts do not inherently create unequal bargaining
power for one side, and the two parties specifically negotiated this provision,

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *13.
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that there was no special relationship between the two and therefore no
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.171
Finding that the terms of the farmout agreement were unambiguous and
that there was no duty of good faith and fair dealing, the court turned to the
meaning of the consent to assign provision.172 Agreeing with the court of
appeals, the supreme court found that Carrizo’s ability to withhold consent
was unqualified could therefore withhold “consent for any reason, expressed
or not, reasonable or not, legitimate or not, or no reason at all.”173 Therefore,
because the provision allowed Carrizo to withhold its consent for any reason,
it could not have breached the agreement and there could not have been
tortious interference as a matter of law and therefore these claims should not
have been submitted to the jury.174
Justice Guzman, disagreeing with the majority, noted that precedent
throughout the years supports the conclusion that even though the terms of
the consent to assign provision were unambiguous, the court should have
allowed in trade custom and usage to inform the contract which would have
resulted in the application of a reasonableness standard to the provision. By
not doing so, the court erred in concluding that the consent to assign
provision was silent as to when consent could be withheld, which would have
been answered using trade custom and usage evidence. Further, because trade
custom and usage in a specific scenario is a question of fact, the trial court
properly submitted the issue to the jury. Another point to the trade custom
and usage issue was that Carrizo could have just contracted around it and that
by not doing so, and assuring Barrow-Shaver it would give consent,
established that Carrizo intended to abide by trade custom and usage.175
The court, addressing the second issue, turned to Barrow-Shaver’s fraud
claim.176 The crux of the court’s holding on this matter deals with one
essential element of a fraud claim: whether the claimant justifiably relied on
the representation.177 The court here found that Barrow-Shaver did not
justifiably rely on Carrizo’s landman’s claim that consent would not be
unreasonably withheld.178 First, this oral promise was in direct contradiction

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at *14.
Id. at *16.
Id.
Id. at *17.
Id. (Guzman, J., concurring).
Id. at *18.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *21.
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to the written contract.179 Second, Barrow-Shaver is a sophisticated party
with full understanding of the implications of the consent to assign provision
that they agreed to.180 Third, Carrizo’s oral representations were vague and
unverifiable which should have alerted Barrow-Shaver that they could not be
relied upon.181 Finally, Barrow-Shaver should have known that the landman
acting on behalf of Carrizo had no authority to assure Barrow-Shaver that
consent would not be unreasonably withheld.182
Justice Guzman also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion as to the
fraud claim. Justice Guzman stated that “a fraud claim can be based on a
promise made with no intention of performing, irrespective of whether the
promise is later subsumed within a contract” because “the legal duty not to
fraudulently procure a contract is separate and independent from the duties
established by the contract itself.”183 Further, the court has recognized that
“[b]reach alone is no evidence that breach was intended when the contract
was originally made,” but “breach combined with ‘slight circumstantial
evidence’ of fraud is enough to support a verdict for fraudulent
inducement.”184 Justice Guzman, who would have found a breach of contract
as stated above, stated that she would have also found at least some evidence
that Carrizo did not intend to give consent, regardless of their repeated
representations, and therefore perpetrated a fraud upon Barrow-Shaver.185
Therefore, because the majority found that the consent to assign provision
was unambiguous, there was no breach of the farmout agreement. 186 Also,
because Barrow-Shaver could not have justifiably relied on Carrizo’s
representations, there could not have been a fraud.187

179. Id. at *20.
180. Id. at *17.
181. Id. at 21-22.
182. Id. at *18-19.
183. Id. (Guzman, J., concurring) (quoting, Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs
& Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. 1998)).
184. Id. (Guzman, J., concurring) (quoting Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212
S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2006) (internal quotation omitted)).
185. Id. (Guzman, J., concurring).
186. Id. at *22.
187. Id.
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J. Cotenancy
1. Cimarex Energy Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 574 S.W.3d 73
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2019), pet. for rev. filed (June 28, 2019).
In late 2009, Cimarex leased an undivided 1/6 mineral interest held by the
Estate of F. Kirk Johnson, III.188 Between 2007 and 2010, Anadarko acquired
the other 15/16 mineral interests in the land.189 In 2011 and 2012, Anadarko
commenced drilling operations on two wells on the land, and by December
2012, both wells were producing in paying quantities.190 In early 2011, F.
Kirk Johnson, IV and Marsland Johnson succeeded the interests of the Estate
of F. Kirk Johnson, III and executed two top leases to Petro-Land Group,
Inc., which eventually assigned the leases to Anadarko.191 Cimarex learned
of the wells in September 2012 and subsequently wrote a letter to Anadarko
demanding their proportionate share of royalties, an accounting of the costs
and revenues associated with the wells, and affording them the opportunity
to join in the operation of the wells through a joint operating agreement
(“JOA”).192 Anadarko eventually responded recognizing Cimarex’s right to
its proportionate share of royalties because of its status as a non-participating
co-tenant.193 However, the payments never came and Cimarex sued. In
addition, Cimarex filed an application to force pool an Anadarko well that
was located one foot within Cimarex’s lease boundary.194
The two parties reached a settlement in June 2013 which resolved the
lawsuit and the force pooling application.195 The settlement provided that: (1)
Anadarko would provide an accounting for Cimarex’s share of production on
the two wells; (2) they would pay them for their proportionate share of
production through May 2013, less Cimarex’s share of drilling, completion,
and operating costs; and (3) going forward, Anadarko would account to
Cimarex monthly for their share of production.196 Both parties agreed to pay
their respective royalties to their lessors.197

188. Cimarex Energy Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 574 S.W.3d 73, 80-81 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2019), pet. for rev. filed (June 28, 2019).
189. Id. at 81.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 82.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 83.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 83-84.
197. Id.
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Anadarko complied with the settlement agreement, and in December
2014, when the primary term of Cimarex’s lease expired, Anadarko ceased
making payments to Cimarex.198 Anadarko claimed that Cimarex’s lease had
expired and therefore there was no longer an obligation to make the
payments.199 Further, it claimed that because the lease had expired and
Anadarko had paid the bonus provided for in the top lease, Anadarko had the
only valid lease on the property.200 Cimarex sued, alleging Anadarko had
breached their contractual obligation under the settlement agreement.201 Both
parties moved for summary judgment.202 The trial court granted Anadarko’s
motion for summary judgment finding that Cimarex could not rely on
Anadarko’s production to extend the lease into the secondary term. 203
Cimarex appealed.
Cimarex raised three arguments during its appeal as to why the lease had
not terminated in December 2014. First, it argued that the terms of the lease
were ambiguous, hereby raising an issue of fact which should have been
presented to a jury.204 The court of appeals found that there was only one
reasonable interpretation of the lease and therefore the lease was
unambiguous.205 The court, in coming to this conclusion, focused on the
language of the habendum clause: “as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced
from said land or from land with which said land is pooled.”206 Cimarex
argued that the passive nature of the provision only required production on
the land and did not require any specific party to cause the production.207
However, the court recognized that various Texas courts, including their
own, had interpreted similar language to require the lessee to be the party to
cause production.208 In other words, Cimarex needed to be the one that caused
production from said land, not a third party such as Anadarko. The court also
found significance in the fact that, because the lease was signed with
Cimarex, it was the lessor’s intent that Cimarex would be the party to cause
the production.209
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 92.
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Cimarex’s second argument was that the lease unambiguously allowed
Cimarex to rely on Anadarko’s production to carry the lease into the
secondary term.210 Cimarex noted that the primary term was written in the
passive voice, did not specify who was to cause production, and allowed
Cimarex to rely on Anadarko’s production.211 They then pointed out that the
habendum clause was also written in the passive voice and failed to specify
who was to cause production and therefore, it would be inconsistent to say
that Cimarex could not also rely on Anadarko’s production during the
secondary term.212 The court disagreed with this argument as well. The court
found that the lessor has the right to impose different requirements on a lessee
during the primary and secondary terms.213 The court stated:
[T]here is nothing inherently contradictory with a lessor requiring
a lessee to make royalty payments on a co-tenant’s production
during the primary term of a lease—particularly where the
primary term is paid-up—while at the same time requiring the
lessee to cause its own production on the subject property in order
to extend the lease into a secondary term, where there is no cash
consideration paid.214
Cimarex’s final argument was that the settlement agreement, in effect,
created a JOA between the two parties.215 The court, finding none of the
hallmarks of a JOA and finding it significant that the settlement agreement
consistently referred to Cimarex as a “non-participating co-tenant”, denied
this argument and again found in favor of Anadarko.216
Rejecting all of Cimarex’s arguments that the lease did not actually
terminate in December 2014, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in
favor of Anadarko.217

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 94.
Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 101.
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L. Top Leases
1. TRO-X, L.P. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 548 S.W.3d 458 (Tex.
2018).
In 2007, TRO-X executed oil and gas leases (“2007 Leases”) with David
E. Cooper; Hill–Cooper, Ltd.; Richard W. Cooper; Kendall C. Hill; and
Shirley Cooper (“the Coopers”).218 The leases contained a provision
requiring TRO-X to drill an offset well if a well was drilled on adjacent land
within 660 feet of the lease boundaries and producing in paying quantities.219
If TRO-X failed to do so, then upon demand from the Coopers, TRO-X was
required to release a specified portion of the lease.220 TRO-X later assigned
its interest to Eagle Oil & Gas Co. (“Eagle Oil”).221 The participation
agreement, which effectuated the assignment, contained a 5% working
interest back-in option to TRO-X if the leases reached “project payout.”222
The participation agreement also included an anti-wash out clause providing
that the back in option could not be eliminated by the surrender of the leases
by Eagle Oil or a subsequent assignee and the subsequent reacquisition of a
lease on the same land free of the 5% working interest.223
Eagle Oil assigned its interest in the 2007 Leases to Anadarko.224
Anadarko eventually completed a well within 660 feet of the 2007 Leases
boundary, and failed to complete an offset well as required.225 In May 2011,
Richard Cooper wrote a letter to Anadarko demanding that the land specified
in the lease be released due to Anadarko’s failure to drill the offset well.226
Anadarko complied and then approached the Coopers about signing new
leases on the interests covered under the 2007 Leases.227 The Coopers,
reaching agreeable terms with Anadarko, executed new leases on their
interest in 2011 (“2011 Leases”).228 The 2011 Leases do not mention the
2007 Leases, nor do they contain language releasing the 2007 Leases.229
Although the 2011 Leases did not contain language releasing the 2007
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

TRO-X, L.P. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 548 S.W.3d 458, 459 (Tex. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Leases, Anadarko did record releases (“the Releases”) of the 2007 Leases in
June 2011 within a few days of when the 2011 Leases were recorded.230
TRO-X approached Anadarko about its back in option and Anadarko denied
its validity.231 TRO-X’s sued.232
The trial court found that the 2011 Leases were top leases because the
2007 leases remained in effect until the Releases were executed, which was
after the execution of the 2011 Leases.233 On appeal, the court determined
that TRO-X was tasked with proving that the Coopers did not intend for the
2011 Leases to terminate the 2007 Leases in order to prevail.234 The court,
after reviewing the evidence presented, determined that TRO-X failed to
prove the Coopers intent for the 2011 Leases to be top leases and therefore
reversed the trial court’s holding.235
Whether or not the 2011 Leases were top leases of the 2007 Leases
remained the main issue at the supreme court.236 Anadarko claimed that,
because the “leases did not exist at the same time, and the 2011 Leases were
not contingent on expiration or termination of the 2007 Leases because
execution of the 2011 Leases terminated the 2007 Leases,” the 2011 Leases
were not top leases.237 TRO-X countered claiming that, absent discrete
evidence of intent to eliminate a lease(s), predecessor existing leases remain
effective. The supreme court sided with Anadarko.238 The court stated that:
an existing lease between the parties as to an interest terminates
when the parties enter into a new lease covering that interest
unless the new lease objectively demonstrates that both parties
intended for the new lease not to terminate the prior lease between
them.239
Further, the court clarified that the party claiming that a new lease did not
terminate the previous one, in this case TRO-X has the burden of proving the
parties’ intent that the previous lease was to survive execution of the new
lease.240 It also clarified that it is the intent of both parties that is relevant, not
230.
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233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
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240.
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just the lessors.241 The court found that TRO-X did fulfill this burden and
therefore the 2011 Leases terminated the 2007 Leases, hereby affirming that
court of appeals decision.242
M. Upcoming Cases
1. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Leon Oscar Ramirez, Jr., 534 S.W.3d 490 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2017), cert. granted 2019 Tex. LEXIS 716 (Tex.
June 28, 2019).
Leon Oscar Ramirez, Sr. (“Leon Sr.”) was the beneficiary of a life estate
of a 1/4 interest in a tract of land which he inherited from his mother,
Leonor.243 Leon Sr. executed a lease with ConocoPhillips (“Conoco”) for his
interest in the land in 1993 and 1997.244 The remaindermen of Leon Sr.’s
interest, Leon Oscar Ramirez, Jr. (“Leon Jr.”), Minerva, and Rosalinda, were
not signatories to these leases.245 Leon Sr. passed away in 2006, terminating
his life estate.246
In 2010, Leon Jr., Minerva, and Rosalinda filed suit against Conoco
claiming that, because they were remainderman and had an interest in the
subject land’s minerals, and they did not sign the prior leases, the leases were
not binding on them and therefore they were entitled to a cotenancy
accounting and payment of their proportionate share of production by
Conoco.247 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of
Leon Jr., Minerva, and Rosalinda finding that the leases were not binding on
them and therefore they were cotenants entitled to their share of production
from the leases.248
The Texas supreme court granted review of this case in June 2019. Oral
arguments are set for September 17, 2019.249
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